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ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS 
 
 
Controlling emerging zoonoses 
at the animal-human interface 
 
by 
 
Riley Olivia Mummah 
 
Master of Science in Epidemiology 
University of California, Los Angeles, 2020 
Professor Anne W. Rimoin, Chair 
 
For many emerging or re-emerging pathogens, cases in humans arise from a mixture of 
introductions (via zoonotic spillover from animal reservoirs or geographic spillover from endemic 
regions) and secondary human-to-human transmission.  Interventions aiming to reduce 
incidence of these infections can be focused on preventing spillover or reducing human-to-
human transmission, or sometimes both at once, and typically are governed by resource 
constraints that require policymakers to make choices.  Despite increasing emphasis on using 
mathematical models to inform disease control policies, little attention has been paid to guiding 
rational disease control at the animal-human interface.   
In this thesis, I introduce a modeling framework to analyze the impacts of different 
disease control policies, focusing on pathogens exhibiting subcritical transmission among 
humans.  We quantify the relative effectiveness of measures to reduce spillover (e.g. reducing 
 iii 
contact with animal hosts), human-to-human transmission (e.g. case isolation), or both at once 
(e.g. vaccination), across a range of epidemiological contexts.  
This analysis provides guidelines for choosing which mode of control to prioritize in 
different epidemiological scenarios and considering different levels of resource and relative 
costs. We contextualize our analysis with current zoonotic pathogens and other subcritical 
pathogens, such as post-elimination measles, and control policies that have been applied. This 
work provides a model-based, theoretical foundation to understand and guide policy for 
subcritical zoonoses, integrating across disciplinary and species boundaries in a manner 
consistent with One Health principles. 
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BACKGROUND 
Zoonotic pathogens are a major threat to global health, both through their on-going 
contributions to disease burden and their potential contributions to the emergence of novel 
pandemic pathogens (1). Zoonotic spillover is defined as transmission of a pathogen from an 
animal host to a susceptible human and is the source of diseases from monkeypox to plague to 
leishmaniasis. Risk of zoonotic spillover is driven by many ecological, epidemiological, and 
behavioral factors across scales (2–4). The combination of animal ecology, human behavior, 
and environmental conditions can lead to cross-species transmission and, thus, requires a 
OneHealth perspective to evaluate and respond to outbreaks of disease. 
Beyond the complexity of the zoonotic spillover process, zoonotic pathogens differ 
greatly with respect to their efficiency of human-to-human transmission (5,6). Transmissibility 
between humans is described by the reproductive number, R0, which is defined as the average 
number of secondary cases caused by a single infected individual in an entirely susceptible 
population (7). Some zoonotic pathogens face pre-existing immunity in the population, and are 
governed by the effective reproductive number, Reff, which is the average number of secondary 
cases in a population with both susceptible and immune individuals (8–10). For simplicity, we 
will use R throughout this study to refer to R0 or Reff, in either case representing the efficiency of 
human-to-human transmission before further control measures are considered. 
It is useful to classify zoonoses by their transmissibility among humans, as captured by 
their R value (6). For pathogens with R=0, like West Nile virus or rabies virus, transmission only 
occurs through spillover, and the pathogen is unable to transmit between humans. When R is 
between 0 and 1, the pathogen is subcritical and causes self-limiting outbreaks, as for 
monkeypox virus, Nipah virus, or some avian influenza viruses. Supercritical pathogens with R 
> 1, such as pandemic influenza or Ebola virus, can cause epidemics or pandemics in the 
human population. 
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Subcritical zoonoses have been understudied by infectious disease modelers, likely 
because they do not align with dominant modeling frameworks, they require integration of 
animal and human dynamics, and they presently lack pandemic potential (6). Modeling effort on 
these systems has been particularly sparse for questions of disease control and its economic 
components, and the interplay between spillover and human-to-human transmission in driving 
the epidemiology of subcritical pathogens. Some improvements have been made in the last 
decade, especially in methods for estimating R for subcritical pathogens (11–15), but there is 
still a lack of theory to guide control efforts (16). This paper aims to address this gap.  We note 
that our findings extend directly to non-zoonotic pathogens such as post-elimination measles, 
where R<1 due to herd immunity, and geographic importation plays the role of spillover.  Our 
work also applies equally to pathogens that transmit directly or via arthropod vectors. 
Control measures for subcritical zoonoses can be classified into three functional groups 
according to the modes of transmission they aim to reduce: prevention of spillover, reduction of 
human-to-human transmission, and control of both spillover and human-to-human transmission 
jointly (Table 1). Because subcritical pathogens cannot cause epidemics and every outbreak is 
triggered by a spillover event, public health policy may naturally focus on spillover prevention. 
However as R rises toward 1, an increasing proportion of cases are caused by human-to-human 
transmission (Figure 1). This leads to open questions about how to target control measures. 
Should control be targeted at animal-to-human transmission, human-to-human transmission, or 
both? Furthermore, for pathogens that spill over infrequently, implementing controls that focus 
on human-to-human transmission when there are no active outbreaks does not seem cost 
effective. Would a reactive strategy which switches from preventing zoonotic spillover to 
reducing human-to-human transmission be more effective? 
This decision space gets more complicated when economic costs of control are considered, 
especially because measures to reduce different types of transmission may differ in cost. 
Similarly, there are often known host or environmental factors that influence spillover risk. 
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Epidemiological risk factor studies can define these factors so high-risk groups can be identified. 
For example, individuals in contact with dromedary camels and hunting or handling bushmeat 
are at higher risk for transmission of middle east respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS) and 
simian retroviruses, respectively (17,18). Can targeted reduction of spillover in these high-risk 
groups be an effective control measure for subcritical pathogens? This study presents a general 
theory to build intuition and give evidence-based guidelines for effective control of subcritical 
zoonoses (or other subcritical pathogens). Our framework reveals general principles to aid 
policymakers faced with difficult decisions and resource constraints and can be adapted to 
specific pathogens and settings to guide concrete decisions and support allocation of finite 
resources. 
 
METHODS 
Total incidence of subcritical zoonoses 
For a subcritical zoonosis, the total incidence of infection in the human population arises 
from a mixture of primary and secondary cases. We assume that zoonotic spillover events 
(primary cases) occur at some characteristic total rate λz in a population of interest, e.g. λz might 
represent 100 spillover events per year in a given administrative region.  Each human case is 
then capable of transmitting the infection to cause secondary cases, with the reproductive 
number R denoting the expected number of secondary cases per infected human.  
It is possible to model the stochastic dynamics of transmission in the human population 
using a branching process (19–21) or similar formulation. For the present analysis, it is sufficient 
to focus on the expected dynamics of these models.  The first generation of transmission (i.e. 
those infected by the index case) will have R cases, on average.  Each of these cases will infect 
another R cases, so the second generation will have R2 cases, and so on.  Thus the mean 
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number of cases in each minor outbreak, including the primary case that triggers the outbreak, 
is given by a geometric series, and for R < 1 (22):  
𝐸(𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙	#	𝑜𝑓	𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠	𝑝𝑒𝑟	𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑏𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑘) = 1 + 𝑅 + 𝑅7 + 𝑅8 +⋯	
= 11 − 𝑅 (1) 
The expected total incidence rate I is then given by the product of the spillover rate and the 
mean number of cases associated with each spillover event:  
𝐼 = 𝜆=1 − R . (2) 
Proportion of cases infected by human sources 
As shown above (Eqn 1), when R < 1, the expected number of cases that result from 
each introduction is 1/(1-R).  Because there is one primary case per introduction, the proportion 
of cases that are primary is given by the reciprocal of this quantity and is equal to (1-R).  Thus, 
for zoonotic pathogens with R < 1, the expected proportion of cases infected by humans is R. 
 
Analysis of control measures for stuttering zoonoses 
We consider the effect on total incidence of control measures that reduce spillover rates, 
human-to-human transmission, or both.  Let 𝑐= be the factor by which control measures reduce 
spillover rates, and 𝑐A	be the factor by which control measures reduce the reproductive number 
in the human population.  When these reduction factors equal 1, there is no impact on 
transmission; when they equal 0, that mode of transmission is halted completely. The total 
incidence under control, 𝐼B, is then: 𝐼B = 𝑐=𝜆=1 − 𝑐A𝑅 (3) 
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For control measures that affect both modes of transmission equally, such as protective 
vaccination of humans, 𝑐= = 𝑐A = 𝑐 and this expression simplifies accordingly. 
In settings where it is necessary to choose between measures to reduce zoonotic 
spillover (via 𝑐=) and measures to reduce human-to-human transmission (via 𝑐A), we can 
compare the total incidence when each measure is in place.  The point where the two strategies 
are equivalent is given by: 𝜆=1 − 𝑐A𝑅 = 𝑐=𝜆=1 − 𝑅 (4) 
Since the zoonotic spillover rate enters both sides linearly, the preferred strategy in a given 
context is governed by the reproductive number.  Rearranging these expressions, we can find 
the value of the reproductive number where the two strategies are equivalent: 
𝑅EFGHBI = 1 − 𝑐=1 − 𝑐=𝑐A (5) 
When R > Rswitch, the strategy to reduce human-to-human transmission will yield a greater 
reduction in incidence.  
 
Cost-benefit analysis of control measures  
To incorporate the influence of differing cost, we consider how the effectiveness of 
control measures varies with effort using a simple model for the principle of diminishing returns 
on investment (Error! Reference source not found.).  This corresponds to many public health s
ettings where heterogeneity in the structure, accessibility and compliance of populations means 
that the incremental cost of expanding coverage rises as coverage rises.  We model this 
phenomenon by setting the effectiveness of control measures to be a declining exponential 
function of resources invested, r. To reflect the different costs of different control strategies, we 
introduce a factor a to scale the return on investment for reducing spillover relative to reducing 
human-to-human transmission: 
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𝑐= = 𝑒KLM	𝑎𝑛𝑑	𝑐A = 𝑒KM (6) 
Substituting these expressions into Equation 5 and solving for the value of the reproductive 
number Rswitch at which the strategies are equivalent, we find: 
𝑅EFGHBI = 1 −	𝑒KLM1 − 𝑒K(LQR)M (7) 
Rswitch is the value of Reff above which control measures should be targeted at human-to-human 
transmission, for a given level of resource investment. The curves in Figure 3 are generated by 
plotting 1	–	𝑐= (or equivalently, 1 − 𝑒KLM) versus Rswitch parametrically as a function of r, for 
different values of the relative cost a (which are shown as different line types). 
 
Analysis of reactive control measures 
For a given reduction factor (c) describing the effectiveness of control, the greatest 
reduction in incidence is obtained from control measures such as vaccination that 
simultaneously reduce both zoonotic spillover and human-to-human transmission.  When this is 
not possible and when resources are constraining, it may be desirable to implement control 
measures in a reactive manner.  Here we analyze the impact of control policies that focus on 
reducing spillover as a default but switch their focus to reducing human-to-human transmission 
when an outbreak has been detected.  We assume that the switch occurs after k generations of 
transmission among humans, reflecting inevitable delays in case identification and policy 
implementation. If control is imposed after the first generation of human-to-human transmission 
has occurred (k=1), then the first generation will have expected size R and subsequent 
generations will have expected size 𝑐A𝑅.  Thus, the expected number of cases in the minor 
outbreak will be: 𝐸(𝑋) = 1 + 𝑅 + 𝑅(𝑐A𝑅) + 𝑅(𝑐A𝑅)7 +⋯	= 1𝑐A V 11 − 𝑐A𝑅W + V1 − 1𝑐AW (8) 
 7 
In the Supplement we show that the general form, for a delay of k generations, will be: 
𝐸(𝑋) = 1𝑐AY 	V 11 − 𝑐A𝑅W +Z𝑅GYG[\ ]1	 − 	 𝑐AG𝑐AY^	 (9) 
Thus the total incidence under reactive control strategy, with reduction factors 𝑐A and 𝑐=, is: 
𝐼B = 𝑐=𝜆= ` 1𝑐AY 	V 11 − 𝑐A𝑅W +Z𝑅GYG[\ ]1	 −	 𝑐AG𝑐AY^a (10) 
 
This expression was used to plot the green curves in Figure 3 with 𝑐A = 𝑐=. 
 
Decomposing spillover rate into risk groups 
For most zoonotic pathogens, zoonotic spillover risk is not fixed across the population 
due to variation in ecological, epidemiological, and behavioral factors. To explore how 
heterogeneous spillover risk might influence the choice of disease control strategy, we analyze 
a model with two defined groups with different risk of zoonotic infection. We define p as the 
proportion of the population in the group with higher risk of zoonotic spillover. Let 𝜆c be the 
spillover rate for the high-risk group and 𝜆d be the spillover rate for the low risk group. Then the 
total spillover rate  𝜆=	can be written as 𝑝𝜆c + (1 − 𝑝)𝜆d. Thus, in the absence of control 
measures, the incidence is given by: 
𝐼 = 𝑝𝜆c + (1 − 𝑝)𝜆d1 − 𝑅 (11) 
 
Analysis of control measures for subcritical zoonoses with risk groups 
We now consider the effect of different control measures when there are defined high-
risk and low-risk spillover groups. Like before, we can apply a general spillover reduction term, 𝑐e, that applies to both risk groups to reduce the two spillover rates equally. The total incidence 
is then: 
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𝐼B = 𝑐e(𝑝𝜆c 	+ (1 − 𝑝)𝜆d)1 − 𝑐A𝑅 (12) 
In settings with defined risk groups, interventions that target the high-risk group are an 
attractive strategy for reducing overall incidence. To model control measures targeted at the 
high-risk spillover group, we define 𝑐c	to be the factor by which control measures reduce 
spillover rates in the high-risk group. The total incidence under such a targeted control policy is 
then: 
𝐼B = 𝑐c𝑝𝜆c 	+ (1 − 𝑝)𝜆d1 − 𝑐A𝑅 (13) 
We assume that targeted control makes more efficient use of resources, in proportion to the 
size of the high-risk group.  Thus to calculate the effect of targeted control in our cost-benefit 
analyses, we multiply the resources invested by a factor 1/p.  The reduction factor 𝑐c is thus a 
function of resources invested, r, the factor a that reflects the relative cost of reducing spillover 
versus reducing human-to-human transmission, and the proportion of high-risk individuals in the 
population, p: 𝑐c = 𝑒KLM/g (14) 
Different combinations of targeted spillover reduction, universal spillover reduction, and efforts 
to reduce R give rise to incidence expressions similar to Equations (10) and (13).  Table S1 
contains the full list of equations that were used to plot the curves in Figure 5 and 7. 
 
RESULTS 
Incidence and control of subcritical zoonoses 
Our analysis of control measures for subcritical zoonoses is guided by strikingly simple 
predictions, derived from basic theory for outbreak dynamics, about the expected proportion of 
all human cases infected by other humans versus by animals (Figure 1; Eqn 1). The relative 
importance of these transmission routes in any system is governed by the efficiency of human-
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to-human transmission, as quantified by R.  For subcritical zoonoses with R < 1, the expected 
number of cases that result from each introduction (including the 1 primary case) is 1/(1– R), 
and thus the proportion of cases infected by humans is R.  When R > 1, endemic circulation of 
the pathogen in the human population is possible. Averaging over many introductions, 
secondary cases from successful outbreaks greatly outweigh the primary cases, including 
instances where introductions go extinct, and effectively all cases are from human sources. 
For a given rate of zoonotic spillover, the expected total incidence level depends strongly 
on the prevailing value of R, with expected outbreak sizes rising sharply as R approaches 1 
(Figure 3A). Accordingly, disease control interventions exhibit marked differences in 
effectiveness as a function of R, in both absolute and proportional terms (Figure 3A, B).  
Because the total incidence scales linearly with the spillover rate (Eqn 2), measures that reduce 
spillover transmission have a fixed proportional impact, regardless of R (Figure 3B).  Measures 
to reduce human-to-human transmission have limited impact when R is low, compared to 
measures reducing zoonotic spillover, but this situation is reversed dramatically as R 
approaches 1 (Figure 3). When comparing measures that reduce either type of transmission by 
50% (i.e. comparing 𝑐= = 0.5 to 𝑐A = 0.5), spillover-reducing measures are preferred for R 
values up to 0.67, then measures reducing human-to-human transmission are preferred above 
this point (Eqn 5, Figure 3A). The most effective control measures are those, like vaccination, 
that reduce both routes of transmission by a given amount. When vaccines are not available, as 
for many emerging pathogens, a reactive strategy that targets spillover then switches to human-
to-human transmission once an outbreak is detected can be almost as effective, even if the 
switch is delayed for several generations of transmission (Figure 3A,B).   
 
Optimal control strategies with different levels of resources 
We then considered how various control strategies perform under different scenarios of 
resource investment, where resources govern the effectiveness of control measures via our 
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assumption of diminishing returns on investment (Error! Reference source not found.).  Two f
indings stood out.  First, control measures that focus strictly on reducing human-to-human 
transmission will never reduce incidence to zero (Figure 4).  Even with very high resource 
investment, when human-to-human transmission is halted entirely, primary cases are 
undiminished. However, at lower resource levels, measures to reduce human-to-human 
transmission can be cost-effective, depending on the epidemiological context (Figure 4). In low 
transmissibility settings, investing resources into reducing human-to-human transmission is only 
barely better than doing nothing. As R increases, though, we see a growing range of resource 
levels where reducing R is more effective than reducing spillover.  When R=0.9, this difference 
is large and persists throughout almost the full range of incidence reduction – yet only spillover 
reduction can drive incidence to zero (Figure 4).  Unsurprisingly, if it is possible to reduce both 
modes of transmission at the same cost as reducing one, then this is always the most cost-
effective strategy. Notably, though, the reactive strategy is nearly as cost-effective, given the 
costs of reducing cross-species transmission and human-to-human transmission are equal. 
For most emerging zoonoses a vaccine is unavailable, and in many settings reactive 
measures may not be practical due to logistical challenges, unavoidable delays, or 
shortcomings in surveillance. In these settings a choice must be made between reducing 
zoonotic spillover or reducing human-to-human transmission, and we can determine which 
strategy would be most effective for a given R value. The preferred strategy depends on the 
level of resources available, which we quantify here by the proportional reduction in spillover 
that is achievable if all resources are devoted to spillover control (Figure 5).  The curved solid 
line marks the boundary between optimal strategies, assuming it is equally expensive to 
implement spillover reduction or human-to-human transmission reduction (i.e. a = 1). This line 
corresponds to Eqn 7 for Rswitch, plotted parametrically as a function of resource investment (i.e. 
with zero investment and 𝑐= = 1 at the bottom, and infinite investment and 𝑐= = 0 at the top).  
When R is low or resource levels are high (Figure 5 - shaded in orange), it is preferable to cut 
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off zoonoses at the source by focusing control efforts on reducing cross-species spillover. As R 
approaches 1, it becomes more effective to reduce human-to-human transmission, as a 
diminishing number of cases are attributed to spillover. Yet in order to drive total incidence to 
zero, in the limit of high resource investment, it is necessary to focus on spillover reduction.  If 
the costs of the strategies are not equal, the tradeoff line shifts (Figure 5, dotted and dashed 
lines). The greater the cost of reducing spillover transmission relative to reducing human-to-
human transmission, the more the tradeoff curve moves to the left, indicating that targeting 
human-to-human transmission would be a better use of resources for lower R values – though 
spillover reduction always becomes preferable as we aim to push incidence levels toward zero 
(Figure 3,5).  Conversely, if reducing spillover transmission is substantially cheaper than 
reducing human-to-human spread, then spillover reduction remains the preferred strategy for 
values of R approaching 1 (Figure 5).  
 
Risk Heterogeneity and the Potential Benefits of Targeted Control  
In many settings, there are identifiable groups at elevated risk for zoonotic spillover risk, 
and these high-risk groups present an attractive focus for targeted control measures. To 
incorporate a risk structure for spillover in our model, we assumed that the high-risk group 
composed a fixed proportion (here p=0.10) of the population, and varied the rate ratio of 
zoonotic infection (𝜆c/𝜆d) between the high- and low-risk groups. Under no control, total 
incidence grows nonlinearly with increasing R, as in Error! Reference source not found.A, a
nd also rises as the relative risk of spillover in the high-risk group increases (Figure 6A). The 
latter effect is a simple reflection of increased total spillover in the population, as we treat 𝜆d as 
constant.  
Considering different control strategies, we find that the broad hierarchy of strategies as 
described above is remarkably robust to heterogeneities in spillover risk, while the 
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epidemiological parameters shape the potential benefit of targeted control.  We first observe 
that untargeted control policies, such as general awareness campaigns aimed at reducing 
spillover in the whole population or human-to-human transmission, are unaffected by the 
defined risk groups (Figure 6B & C). In contrast, a targeted strategy to reduce spillover, such as 
vaccination of people at high risk of contacting infected animals, will have varying impact 
depending on the risk ratio (Figure 6D), but as with universal spillover reduction (Figure 6B), this 
impact does not exhibit any dependence on R.  We also note that the overall incidence 
reduction appears lower for targeted control than for universal spillover control, but this is 
because this plot assumes equal reduction factors (c=0.5) for all control measures; under this 
assumption, control measures are inevitably more impactful when applied to the whole 
population versus a high-risk group of just 10% of the population.  Considering mixed strategies 
that combine targeted control of the high-risk spillover group with general control of human-to-
human transmission (Figure 6E-H), we see that the benefits of targeted control for total 
incidence reduction are greater for higher risk ratios, but this difference diminishes as R 
approaches 1 and human-to-human transmission dominates the epidemiology.  
Finally, we consider targeted control measures under different resource scenarios, to explore 
the possible benefits of efficiently reducing spillover in the high-risk group.  Again, we see a 
tradeoff between strategies preferred at modest resource levels and those preferred when 
resources are not limiting (Figure 7).  Among strategies that only reduce spillover transmission 
(red and orange lines in Figure 7), targeted control shows considerable benefits at low resource 
levels, particularly for high risk ratios and higher values of R.  Yet targeted strategies are less 
effective at high resource levels, since they do not reduce spillover in the low-risk group, and 
hence can never reduce incidence to zero.  A similar pattern is found for mixed strategies, 
where targeted joint or reactive approaches (i.e. high-risk spillover reduction followed by a 
switch to reducing human-to-human transmission once an outbreak is underway) are the most 
effective control policies at low resource levels, particularly when R > 0.5 and the risk ratio is 
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high, but is incapable of reducing incidence to zero even at high levels of investment. In many 
other epidemiological settings, such as when R is 0.5 or lower and when risk ratios are near 1, 
any benefits to targeted control are imperceptible and tend to be outweighed by the 
disadvantages of allowing spillover to the low-risk group to continue unchecked. 
 
DISCUSSION 
Implementing efficient, cost-effective control measures is crucial for the control of 
emerging infectious disease, both to reduce the disease burden of human cases and to 
minimize the opportunities for pathogen adaptation, international spread, or other adverse 
events. However, for subcritical pathogens that exhibit low transmissibility among humans, it is 
not obvious whether control efforts should focus on reducing primary cases arising from 
spillover from external reservoirs or reducing secondary cases arising from human-to-human 
transmission. Using a simple mathematical model, we developed a theoretical framework to 
guide decisions about how to target resources under scenarios with different pathogen 
transmissibility and risk group structure. We focused on the relative impacts achievable in 
resource-constrained settings, as well as the maximum benefits that could be obtained when 
resource investment was high.  Our work is framed in the context of zoonotic infections, where 
introductions arise via cross-species spillover from animal reservoirs, but our findings translate 
fully to other scenarios where outbreaks of subcritical pathogens are seeded by introductions 
from outside.  This includes vaccine-preventable diseases such as measles in post-elimination 
settings where herd immunity has reduced R below 1, or pathogens such as MRSA in hospitals 
that exhibit inefficient nosocomial transmission (23–25). Geographic importation from endemic 
regions serves as ‘spillover’ for measles, introducing the pathogen into areas where it was 
previously eliminated. Similarly, community introduction of MRSA into hospitals serves as the 
spillover mechanism prior to transmission within the hospital. 
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We found that the optimal focus of control measures for subcritical pathogens depends 
primarily on the human-to-human transmissibility of the pathogen, as summarized by the 
reproductive number R (Figure 3). For pathogens with the lowest transmissibility among 
humans (R near zero), measures to reduce zoonotic spillover are most effective. Thus for these 
zoonoses, strategies such as awareness campaigns to reduce contact with reservoir host 
animals or animals found dead, infection control in live animal markets, culling infected reservoir 
populations, and removing rodents from homes (Table 1) will be most effective in reducing 
human cases. For pathogens with greater transmissibility among humans, reducing human-to-
human transmission becomes more effective.  In such scenarios, preferred control methods will 
include providing personal protective equipment in high-risk settings such as hospitals, 
awareness campaigns to reduce unprotected contact with sick individuals, and strengthened 
surveillance for faster case isolation. Of course, the strongest control strategies would act to 
reduce zoonotic spillover and human-to-human transmission at the same time, as with a 
protective vaccine.  Where this option is not available (or is cost-prohibitive to deploy widely in 
advance of an outbreak), we found that a reactive strategy could achieve nearly the same effect 
without substantially greater investment.  Such a strategy would have a baseline emphasis on 
reducing zoonotic spillover, but when a spillover or subsequent outbreak is discovered, the 
emphasis would shift locally to reducing human-to-human transmission. Strategies could include 
an awareness campaign that focuses on reducing interactions with known animal hosts, such as 
not touching dead animals in the forest, shifting to increased contact precautions and active 
surveillance to detect human cases quickly to reduce human-to-human transmission once an 
outbreak is detected (26).  
Unsurprisingly, many existing control policies designed by public health professionals 
align broadly with the recommendations of our model. For pathogens with low R such as H7N9 
avian influenza, our work advises an emphasis on preventing spillover. This is consistent with 
current public health control measures for H7N9 avian influenza, such as market disinfection or 
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cessation of live poultry trade, which focus on reducing contact with birds and lowering risk of 
cross-species transmission (27–29). In contrast, Lassa virus has a higher R value estimated 
near 0.7 and, thus, has a higher expected proportion of cases which arise from human-to-
human transmission. Public health policy for Lassa fever has recently focused on preventing 
nosocomial transmission between humans (30–32).  In some settings, R changes through time 
due to shifts in population immunity or other factors, and priorities for disease control should 
change accordingly.  For example, R for monkeypox has increased over the decades since the 
cessation of widespread smallpox vaccination around 1980 (33,34), and the historic emphasis 
on spillover transmission should be re-examined in light of changing circumstances.  Similarly, 
R for measles has risen as childhood vaccination rates have dropped (23,35).   
Public health systems frequently deal with resource constraints, in terms of finances and 
human or institutional capacity (36). Exploring the effects of resource investment on the impacts 
of control on overall human incidence, our work illustrates potential trade-offs between higher 
cost effectiveness at low investment versus the ability to reduce incidence to zero at high 
investment (Figure 4). At low investment levels, the best simple strategies are those which 
follow the priorities laid out above, i.e. focusing on spillover if R is low, or on human-to-human 
transmission if R is higher.  However, as resource levels increase, the limitations of these 
simple priorities become clear, because strategies that omit the reduction of spillover cannot 
ever reduce human incidence to zero as they do not decrease the number of primary cases. 
Therefore, it is necessary to incorporate spillover reduction in any policy hoping to drive 
incidence to zero. When all types of interventions are assumed to be available with the same 
cost, then joint approaches that reduce both animal-to-human transmission and human-to-
human transmission are most effective for a given resource level. When resources do not permit 
reduction of both transmission modes simultaneously, practitioners must decide which 
transmission mode is more important to control. Our analysis provides guidance as to which 
transmission method is best to control as a function of resource investment and R, accounting 
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for possible differences in cost (Figure 5). While further work is needed to characterize the cost-
efficacy curves for control measures in particular systems, in order to implement this approach, 
this analysis provides a foundation for rational cost-benefit analysis to support disease control 
policy.  
Zoonotic spillover risk is heterogeneous in the human population, since some groups 
have more frequent or riskier exposures to zoonotic reservoirs due to cultural or occupational 
factors (5).  Our analysis demonstrated that targeted spillover control in these high-risk groups 
offers the potential for markedly greater reductions in incidence, relative to control efforts spread 
across the entire population, when resources are limited. However, these targeted strategies 
are limited in impact as investment levels rise, since they don’t reduce the spillover rate in the 
low-risk group so they can never drive incidence to zero. If there is negligible risk in the low-risk 
group or if the low-risk group receives low-intensity control as a side benefit of the targeted 
control (for instance, via an awareness campaign focused on the high-risk group but available to 
all), then the targeted control strategy would remain the most efficient option.  Ultimately, the 
desirability of targeting the high-risk spillover group depends on the epidemiological context (R 
value), resource level, and risk ratio between the risk groups.  
It is important to recognize that there are often substantial challenges in identifying and 
quantifying risk factors for spillover, to support a rational decision about targeting. For zoonoses 
that spill over very infrequently and unpredictably, such as Ebola virus or some hantaviruses, 
the necessary data are hard to acquire and uncontrolled variation among spillover events can 
obscure patterns. In settings where the majority of individuals engage in potentially high-risk 
activities, yet spillover events are sporadic due to variation at other levels (e.g. in infection 
prevalence in the animal reservoir), it can be difficult to ascertain how the magnitude of risk is 
split across specific risk factors (2). For example, in populations which nutritionally rely on 
bushmeat, the majority of individuals can be exposed to multiple animal species through 
multiple modes of contact (e.g. hunting, food preparation, and cooking), which  all present a 
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potential risk of transmission (37). The resulting difficulties in determining risk factors, and 
identifying distinct high-risk groups, can further complicate the implementation of targeted 
control measures. 
Several caveats should be borne in mind in interpreting our analysis, which point to 
opportunities for further research. For the sake of clarity, our model is based on expected 
incidence levels under different scenarios, but stochastic variation can be large so individual 
outbreaks could differ substantially from our predictions. We also assumed stationarity (i.e. no 
changes in the model parameters through time), ignoring behavior change of affected 
populations or on-the-ground factors that can impede control measures (38).  We did not 
account for superspreading, or for variation in transmissibility across spatial or social contexts, 
both of which can have dramatic effects in the early phase of outbreaks (19,39).   Our analysis 
incorporated heterogeneities in spillover risk but did not address different risk groups for on-
going human-to-human transmission.  Such a scenario could arise due to age-structured mixing 
or susceptibility, or from other risk factors such as occupational exposure in health-care 
settings, and could have important effects on outbreak dynamics (40,41).  The existence of 
distinct risk groups for human-to-human transmission would offer another important opportunity 
for targeted control measures and warrants further investigation.  All of the above complexities 
could be addressed via more complex analytic methods, such as multitype branching 
processes, or via stochastic simulation analyses. 
Our cost-benefit model is theoretical in nature and aims for simplicity rather than realism. 
We used a phenomenological model to represent diminishing returns on investment, but we do 
not properly account for complexities in scaling up control measures in space or time. For the 
reactive strategy, we assumed a clean and immediate switch between reducing spillover and 
reducing human-to-human transmission with no overlap and no lapse in control. In real-world 
settings, ramping up (or terminating) control measures is inevitably more complicated and a 
reactive strategy would likely entail delays and changing effectiveness through time. We also 
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assumed there is no additional cost associated with switching strategies, but this is unlikely to 
be true due to the resources involved in initiating any program. While our theoretical analysis 
enabled a first exploration of the general cost-effectiveness of subcritical disease control, more 
intensive case studies are needed for specific pathogens. 
Subcritical zoonotic pathogens exist at the animal-human interface, and little policy guidance 
exists on the most effective ways to implement controls. In this study we present a framework to 
think systematically about controlling subcritical zoonoses, considering the relative importance 
of reducing animal-to-human spillover versus human-to-human transmission. Our work shows 
how the relative effectiveness of these strategies depends on epidemiological context and 
highlights a trade-off between cost-effectiveness at low resource levels and the potential to 
reduce incidence to zero as investment increases. Our findings illustrate core principles for 
evidence-based control of subcritical zoonoses and provide a foundation for integrative studies 
of particular systems to carry these ideas toward implementation. 
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Table 1: A collection of systems which have implemented control measures targeted at 
spillover animal-to-human transmission, human-to-human transmission, or both and 
their associated reproductive numbers. 
Pathogen R Transmission mode targeted Intervention References 
Subcritical pathogens 
Avian 
influenza 
(H7N9) 
0.06 to 0.35 
(27)  
Spillover 
Reductions in poultry exports 
Market disinfection 
Closure of live poultry trading activities (27–
29,42,43) Human-to-human 
Handwashing 
Social distancing 
Both Poultry trade regulations Health education campaigns 
Avian 
influenza 
(H5N1) 
0.05 to 0.23 
(44) 
Spillover Culling poultry 
(45,46) Human-to-human Active case surveillance 
Both Vaccination 
Nipah 0.48 (47) 
Spillover Avoid consumption of palm sap Covers for palm sap collection vessels (48) Human-to-
human 
Nosocomial interventions 
Monkeypox ~0.3 in 1980s (11) 
Spillover Reduce contact with reservoir animals 
 
(26,33,49,50) 
Human-to-
human 
Improved diagnostics for early case detection 
Vaccinating healthcare workers 
Both Smallpox vaccination  Community-based interventions 
MERS 0.45 (12) 
Spillover Reduction of human contact with camels Camel vaccination (12,51–53) Human-to-
human 
Nosocomial precautions 
Case isolation 
Lassa 0.73 (30) 
Spillover Rodent control 
(30–
32,54,55) Human-to-human 
Nosocomial precautions (PPE) 
Contact precautions (household and hospital 
settings) 
Post-
elimination 
measles 
0.45 (23) 
Spillover 
(reintroduction) Targeted vaccination of international travelers (23,24,56) 
Both Vaccination 
Supercritical pathogens 
SARS 2.7 (57) 
Spillover Culling civets Reducing contacts in live markets 
(57,58) Human-to-
human 
Quarantine 
Case isolation 
Contact precautions 
Ebola 1.5 to 2.5 (59–61) 
Spillover Avoid contact with animals found dead Vaccination of nonhuman primates 
(59,62–67) Human-to-
human 
Safe burial 
Contact precautions (PPE) 
Drug treatments 
Ring vaccination 
Both Vaccination of general population 
Yellow 
fever 4.8 (68) 
Spillover Vector control 
(69,70) 
Human-to-
human 
Urban vector control 
Both Vaccination Protective behavior (PPE) 
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Figure 1: The expected source of infection for cases is determined by the reproductive 
number for human-to-human transmission. 
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Figure 2: The cost function for control measures.  
The solid black line indicates equal cost between implementing spillover control and reducing 
human-to-human transmission. The x-axis shows an arbitrary scale of resource investment. The 
dashed and dotted lines show a 2-fold and 10-fold difference, respectively, in the costs of the 
two control measures. Each line is marked by the relative cost of reducing spillover by a given 
proportion compared to the cost of reducing human-to-human transmission by the same 
proportion. 
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Figure 3: Impacts of different control measures on incidence of a zoonotic infection with 
initial value of R (i.e. before control) between 0 and 1.  
Panel A illustrates the effects of control on the total incidence expected in a focal population, 
whereas panel B shows the proportional reduction in expected incidence when compared to the 
incidence level without control (black line). In A, the black line shows how the expected total 
incidence increases nonlinearly with R, for a fixed rate of zoonotic spillover. Colored lines show 
the total incidence that would result from interventions that cause 50% reductions in spillover 
transmission (red), human-to-human transmission (blue), or both types of transmission (purple). 
Green lines show the incidence resulting from a reactive intervention strategy, where effort is 
focused on reducing spillover transmission but is shifted to reducing human-to-human 
transmission once an outbreak is detected. The three green lines show the total incidence 
resulting when control is shifted after one, two, or three generations of transmission among 
humans, respectively from bottom to top. 
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Figure 4: Impacts of control measures with varying resource investments on incidence of 
a zoonotic infection with R between 0 and 1.  
Each panel shows a different R (before control) value. The black lines show the incidence under 
no control. Colored lines show the change in total incidence that would result from increasing 
investment for interventions that cause reductions in spillover transmission (red), human-to-
human transmission (blue), or both types of transmission (purple). The green line shows the 
incidence for increasing investment resulting from a reactive intervention strategy, where effort 
is focused on reducing spillover transmission but is shifted to reducing human-to-human 
transmission once an outbreak is detected (Detection after two generations of transmission is 
shown). Controls measures targeting spillover transmission are assumed to be equally costly as 
measures targeting human-to-human transmission, i.e. α=1. 
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Figure 5: Policy guidance whether incidence will be reduced more by focusing on 
reducing spillover transmission or human-to-human transmission, for different values of 
R (before control) and the reduction in spillover that is achievable given resource 
constraint.  
The solid line shows the boundary between preferred strategies when costs of the two types of 
control are equal, as defined by Equation (5). The dashed and dotted lines show how the 
boundary shifts due to differences in relative cost (each line is labeled by the relative cost of 
reducing spillover by a given proportion compared to the cost of reducing R by the same 
proportion). 
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Figure 6: Impacts of different control measures on the total incidence of a zoonotic 
infection with R (before control) between 0 and 1 with a varying ratio of high and low 
spillover rates.  
Panel A shows how total incidence increases with R for varying ratios of high-to-low zoonotic 
spillover. Panels B-E illustrate proportional reduction in incidence for controls that would cause 
50% reductions in high-risk spillover transmission (B), universal spillover transmission (C), 
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human-to-human transmission (D), or jointly high-risk and human-to-human transmission (E). 
Panels F-H show the proportional reduction in incidence given a reactive strategy that first 
targets high-risk spillover and then switches to reducing human-to-human transmission after 1, 
2, or 3 generations of transmission, respectively. The proportion of high-risk individuals in the 
population was set to 0.10. 
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Figure 7: Impacts of different control measures with varying resource investment on the 
total incidence of a zoonotic infection with R (before control) between 0 and 1 with 
different ratios of high-to-low spillover rates.  
Columns (left to right) show increasing values of R. Rows (top to bottom) represent an 
increasing ratio of spillover rates in high-risk versus low-risk groups (𝜆c 𝜆d⁄ ). The black lines 
indicate total incidence under no control. Colored lines represent the reduction in incidence for 
increasing resource investment. These scenarios were explored earlier in Figure 4 but now 
include the added comparison of targeted versus universal spillover control for all strategies. 
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SUPPLEMENT 
Derivation for the expected size of an outbreak under reactive control measures, for an 
implementation delay of k generations 
Under a reactive control strategy, human-to-human transmission is not controlled for k 
generations of transmission, representing delays in detecting that an outbreak is underway and 
ramping up implementation of new control measures.  Prior to control, each infected case is 
expected to generate R cases in the next generation. Once controls on human-to-human 
transmission are in place, the expected number of cases drops from R to 𝑐A𝑅. Below, we have 
replaced 𝑐A with c for compactness in the derivation. 
Let k be the number of transmission generations in which there is no control. The 
expected number of cases for the general case is derived by the sum of expected cases arising 
from uncontrolled transmission up to generation k, plus the sum of expected cases after 
generation k when control is in place, given by: 
𝐸(𝑋) =Z𝑅GYG[\ +Z𝑅Y(𝑐𝑅)GiG[R 	
=Z𝑅GYG[\ + 1𝑐YZ𝑐Y𝑅Y(𝑐𝑅)GiG[R 	
=Z𝑅GYG[\ + 1𝑐Y jZ(𝑐𝑅)YQGiG[R +Z(𝑐𝑅)GYG[\ k − 1𝑐Y jZ(𝑐𝑅)GYG[\ k	
=Z𝑅GYG[\ + 1𝑐Y jZ(𝑐𝑅)GiG[\ k − jZ 1𝑐Y (𝑐𝑅)GYG[\ k	
= 1𝑐Y l 11 − 𝑐𝑅m +Zl𝑅G − 1𝑐Y (𝑐𝑅)GmYG[\ 	
= 1𝑐Y l 11 − 𝑐𝑅m +Zn𝑅G ]1 − 𝑐G𝑐Y^oYG[\  
 
 30 
Supplementary Table 1: A summary of equations and parameters for two group risk 
model. 
Control measure Equation 
No control 𝐼B = 𝑝𝜆c 	+ (1 − 𝑝)𝜆d1− 𝑅  
Reduction of general spillover 𝐼B = 𝑐e(𝑝𝜆c 	+ (1 − 𝑝)𝜆d)1 − 𝑐A𝑅  
Reduction of high-risk spillover  𝐼B = 𝑐c𝑝𝜆c 	+ (1 − 𝑝)𝜆d1 − 𝑅  
Reduction of R 𝐼B = 𝑝𝜆c 	+ (1 − 𝑝)𝜆d1 − 𝑐A𝑅  
Reduction of universal spillover and 
R 𝐼B = 𝑐e(𝑝𝜆c 	+ (1 − 𝑝)𝜆d)1 − 𝑐A𝑅  
Reduction of high-risk spillover and 
R 𝐼B = 𝑐c𝑝𝜆c + (1 − 𝑝)𝜆d1 − 𝑐A𝑅  
Reduction of general spillover, then 
reduction of R 𝐼B = 𝑐e(𝑝𝜆c + (1 − 𝑝)𝜆d)p 11 − 𝑐A𝑅 + (1 − 𝑐A)Z𝑅GYG[R q 
Reduction of high-risk spillover, then 
reduction of R 𝐼B = (𝑐c𝑝𝜆c + (1 − 𝑝)𝜆d) p 11− 𝑐A𝑅 + (1 − 𝑐A)Z𝑅GYG[R q 
Reduction factor of general spillover 𝑐e = 𝑒KLM  
Reduction factor of R 𝑐A = 𝑒KM 
Reduction factor of high-risk 
spillover 𝑐c = 𝑒KLM/g 
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